



# IDENTITY CENTER

**Policy Paper: The 1988 Disengagement Regulations and Their Effects on Identity and Participation in Jordan**



**IDENTITY**  
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### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**

Since its 1950 inclusion of Palestinians as citizens, the Hashemite Kingdom has continually confronted issues of identity, and many Jordanians have continued to feel as if their nationality is precariously situated. This sentiment became especially acute following Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank in 1988. Not only did the disengagement regulations strip 1.5 million Palestinian-Jordanians of their Jordanian nationality overnight, but they have since been used as a basis for continued citizenship revocations.

While the exact numbers of post-disengagement nationality revocations remains unclear, the impact that these revocations have had on society is overtly manifest. The seemingly random nationality withdrawals have created a national atmosphere in which no one feels secure. Nationality rights, which are constitutionally entrenched and protected by law, seem subject to sporadic revocations. As a result, much of the population – and particularly Palestinian-Jordanians – have been unwilling to confront the Jordanian authorities and increasingly hesitant to exert themselves in Jordanian politics.

Disengagement and the subsequent nationality revocations, however, cannot be understood in a vacuum. Instead they are but the most recent step in a long-term project to define Jordanian identity. Since 1950, the government has pursued several unsuccessful attempts to achieve a consolidated concept of Jordanian nationality. The campaigns have largely failed to foster national stability because they have focused on identity rather than legal nationality, and conflated the two concepts in the process. That is, at the expense of consolidating a civil basis for being Jordanian, the government has attempted to prescribe a Jordanian identity, and thereby excluded large cross sections of the population. As a result, the Kingdom is composed of nationals who continue to define themselves as “Eastern-Jordanian” or “Palestinian-Jordanian” or a multitude of other hyphenated-national identities.

Thus, while the government has focused on these unsuccessful efforts to “Jordanize” the Kingdom's population, this paper suggests an alternate approach to consolidating and stabilizing nationality and national identity. Instead of defining “Jordanian” through a process of exclusion, it suggests an inclusionary method that defines being “Jordanian” not on ethnic or cultural grounds, but upon a civil basis rooted in the rule of law. To lay the foundation for this liberal-democratic basis for nationality this paper provides a series of concrete recommendations for the government. The recommendations focus on nationality rather than identity, concentrating on three main areas:

- Building Jordanians' confidence in their rights by clearly separating issues of citizenship from the disengagement process.
- Strengthening the legal basis for nationality rights so that all Jordanians, regardless of ethnicity, culture or gender, are treated with equal value and provided with equivalent opportunity within the Kingdom.
- Established a legal and constitutional framework that expands the role of political parties and provides all Jordanians with the tools to meaningfully engage in the country's political discourse.

*Jordan is strong and capable of protecting the lives and assets of its citizens, and is also capable of imposing the rule of law at any moment. No individual is stronger than the state. We are a civilised country, founded on the principles of justice, rule of law and respect for citizens' freedom and dignity.<sup>1</sup>*

-King Abdullah II

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:**

While a number of reports have dealt with the issue of disengagement and its immediate implications,<sup>2</sup> this paper attempts to contextualize disengagement within the larger issues of identity and nationality in Jordan. To accomplish this, it relies upon an amalgamation of different sources. The historical background and theoretical framework are largely derived from scholastic sources, while information regarding citizenship revocations and their legal bases has largely been extracted from primary source legal documents as well as reports from international organizations. Information regarding Jordanian views on identity and nationality was distilled from focus groups that the Identity Center led in varying regions throughout the Kingdom in which we interviewed Jordanians involved in politics, civil society, and academic research. Subsequently, the Center organized a phone survey to access a wider cross section of public opinion regarding Jordanian identity.<sup>3</sup> The Center then followed up these activities with workshops and interviews with participants from the focus groups to allow the paper's findings to be reviewed. All of these sources were then integrated to allow disengagement and overarching issues of identity to be understood within a single historical process.

By placing disengagement within the context of identity and political participation, this paper hopes both to raise awareness about the implications of identity on political participation and, more importantly, to bring these issues to the attention of those involved in formulating policy within the Kingdom. While others have sought to further public awareness regarding the humanitarian implications of disengagement, this paper seeks instead to address the shortcomings of the prescriptive identity campaigns that the government has continually formulated and proposes a more inclusive approach to nation building.

### **INTRODUCTION:**

Issues of identity continue to impede political progress in Jordan. The government has repeatedly sought new methods to foster political integration through a unified national identity, but its efforts have largely proved unfruitful. These shortcomings have in large part resulted from the government's attempts to impose a prescriptive identity upon a population that is extensively diverse in terms of ethnicity, culture, tribe, and religion. As a result, vast sections of the population have been alienated and forced to rely on other sources of identity to define themselves. The situation has been exacerbated by the fact that the top-down imposition of a universal identity has not been accompanied by a top-down installation of universal rights. Forces within the government have continually abused the constitutional and legal frameworks that define nationality in the Hashemite Kingdom and deprived Jordanians of their nationality, and, therefore, their rights. The uncertainty that this situation has generated has not only damaged national identity in the Kingdom, but also retarded political participation. This paper, therefore, focuses on

the historical roots of Jordanian nationality and limited political participation and provides suggestions for overcoming these obstacles to political development in the Kingdom.

This paper begins with a brief historical overview of the growing problem of identity in Jordan by examining the disengagement regulations of 1988, the loss of nationality as a result of the regulations, and the subsequent citizen revocations that have occurred into the present. It then reviews the effects that disengagement and the revocations have had on identity and political participation in the Hashemite Kingdom. The paper then describes previous identity policies that Jordan has employed and, having analyzed the results of these programs, suggests a more inclusive strategy for laying a concrete foundation for nation building. The paper concludes with suggested first steps for creating such a foundation.

### **BACKGROUND:**

#### **The Demographic Impact of the 1948 and 1967 Wars**

Of the approximate 700,000 Palestinians who left their homes in what is present day Israel as a result of al-Nakba, nearly one third of them fled to the West Bank and between 70,000 and 100,000 to Transjordan (the East Bank).<sup>4</sup> This significant number arrived in a resource-barren country that then only held a population of between 300,000 and 440,000. Yet, hoping to realize his goal of consolidating an enlarged kingdom on the territory which he had acquired in the 1948 War, King Abdullah conferred Jordanian nationality<sup>1</sup> upon (1) Palestinians indigenous to the West Bank (approximately 440,000), (2) Palestinians who fled from present day Israel to the West Bank (approximately 280,000), as well as (3) 70,000 or more Palestinians who fled directly to the East Bank.<sup>5</sup> These nationality grants were subsequently recognized under the law and constitution.

During the 1967 War, Israel seized the West Bank, Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, and Sinai Peninsula. As a result, a wave of refugees – largely consisting of Palestinians residing in refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza – flooded into Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. Around 200,000 of them fled to the East Bank of Jordan during or immediately after the occupation. The UN General Assembly Resolution 2252 (ES-V) of July 4, 1967 recognized these Palestinians as “displaced persons.” They were defined as those persons “who have been unable to return to the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967.”<sup>6</sup> In Jordan, the legal status of those who fled the West Bank to the East Bank did not change.<sup>7</sup> According to the Jordanian government, these displaced persons had only moved from one part of the Kingdom to another.<sup>8</sup>

#### **Disengagement Regulations of 1988**

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<sup>1</sup> Because the Jordanian constitution and laws use the term “nationality” to refer to a person’s legal attachment to the Kingdom, this paper will continue to use this diction. In this context, however, “nationality” refers to legal nationality, what is more commonly referred to as “citizenship.” It solely connotes one’s legal status in the state, not other connections pertaining to identity or communal association.

Following the 1967 War, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) increasingly fortified its position in the West Bank at Jordan's expense. Along with increased Palestinian support, the PLO also gained international recognition as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" via the Arab League summit in Rabat in 1974.<sup>9</sup> In appreciation of both the strengthened position of the PLO as well as with the threatening instability of the 1987 *intifada*, King Hussein withdrew from the West Bank. On July 31, 1988 King Hussein broadcast a speech to the Jordanian people in which he both announced that Jordan would sever legal and administrative ties with the West Bank and outlined the implications of this policy. The Disengagement Regulations – of which the first were introduced three days before the King's speech and the last on August 20 – confirmed and clarified, albeit not to a great extent, the conditions of disengagement. The Disengagement Regulations package included five sets of changes:<sup>10</sup>

- 1) Jordan cancelled the one billion dollar development programme it has established for the West Bank. This programme has initially been announced in November 1986 as a means of providing West Bankers with incentive to remain on their land.
- 2) The lower house was dissolved by royal decree the day before the King's speech, as half of the sixty representatives that constituted the Chamber of Deputies were drawn from the West Bank.
- 3) Jordan terminated the employment of its approximately 20,000 civil servants in the West Bank. Jordan had continued to pay the salaries and pensions of West Bank municipal civil servants following the Israeli capture of the territory in 1967; this employment now ended. These dismissals, however, did not apply to the 3,000 members of the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Religious Affairs in the West Bank.<sup>11</sup>
- 4) The Supreme Committee for West Bank Affairs and the Ministry for Occupied Territories Affairs, both established in 1980, were dissolved. The Occupied Territories portfolio would no longer merit a ministerial rank, but was instead incorporated into a department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 5) *Lastly, and most importantly, residents of the West Bank lost their Jordanian nationality.* Article 2 of the Regulations states, "[e]very person residing in the West Bank before the date of 31/7/1988 will be considered as Palestinian citizen and not as Jordanian."<sup>12</sup> As a result Palestinian-Jordanians living in the West Bank as of August 1, 1988 became "stateless Palestinians under Israeli occupation," losing all previous nationality rights within Jordan.<sup>13</sup> Family Books that West Bankers possessed were rendered void, and currently-held five year passports were exchanged for two year passports (not connoting nationality) upon their expiry. This change demoted West Bankers to the status of Gazan refugees in Jordan, who had previously received temporary passports without being granted the right of residence or nationality. Additionally, Palestinian-Jordanians residing in the East Bank who worked for the Palestinian National Council were also stripped of their nationality.<sup>14</sup>

### **Disengagement: Heightening the Importance of Bridge Cards**

Disengagement vastly increased the importance of bridge cards, which had been introduced in 1983 to facilitate expedient travel between the East and West Banks. They were created to allow Jordanian authorities to monitor the movement of West Bank Palestinians in the Kingdom and ensure that they actually returned to the West Bank.<sup>15</sup> As a result, different groups of Palestinian-Jordanians were assigned diverse color-differentiated cards. Palestinian-Jordanians who habitually lived on the West Bank were issued green cards. Palestinian-Jordanians who habitually lived on the East Bank (or abroad) but had material or familial connections on the other side, were issued yellow

cards. Likewise, those that held an Israeli Identity number prior to the introduction of the cards were also issued yellow cards. Lastly, Gazan refugees who resided in Jordan were issued blue cards.<sup>16</sup>

What was created as a system of statistical accountability became the basis of determining nationality after 1988. 1.5 million green card holders lost their Jordanian nationality overnight as a result of disengagement, for they were residents of the West Bank and were thus considered Palestinian, and no longer Jordanian. However, not all green card holders were residents of the West Bank; some green card holders had been living for long durations either in the East Bank or abroad. However, they too lost their nationality.<sup>17</sup> These nationality losses occurred despite the fact that King Hussein stressed the continued rights of Palestinian-Jordanians living in the East Bank during his disengagement speech in 1988:

[I]t has to be understood with all clarity, and without any ambiguity, that the measures regarding the West Bank, concern only the occupied Palestinian land and its people. They naturally do not relate in any way to Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. They all have the full rights of citizenship and all its obligations, the same as any other citizen irrespective of his origin.<sup>18</sup>

### **Differing Statuses of Palestinian-Jordanians**

As a result of disengagement and the increased importance of Bridge Cards, the current status of Palestinians within the Kingdom can roughly be divided into four broad categories:<sup>19</sup>

1. **Jordanian-Palestinians without bridge cards** are Jordanians of Palestinian descent who resided in the East Bank at the time of disengagement, held Jordanian nationality, and had no material or familial connection with the West Bank.
2. **Yellow card holders** are Jordanians of Palestinian descent who resided in the East Bank at the time of disengagement, held Jordanian nationality, but had material or familial connections with the West Bank. They were permitted to retain their nationality following disengagement, and were later issued with new Family Books and National Numbers to confirm this status.<sup>20</sup>
3. **Green card holders** are now divided between three categories:
  - a. Jordanians of Palestinian descent who held Jordanian nationality, but resided in the West Bank at the time of disengagement.
  - b. Jordanians of Palestinian descent who resided in the East Bank at the time of disengagement and were issued yellow cards, but have recently had them exchanged for green ones (discussed below).
  - c. Palestinian Residents of Jerusalem. This new category presents a special case, as Israel considers them to be permanent residents without nationality rights, but has recently begun revoking residency rights.
4. **Blue card holders** are Gazan refugees from the 1967 war who reside in Jordan, but have never been granted residency.

## CURRENT PROBLEM

### Continued Revocations

In recent years, the Follow-Up and Inspection Department of the Ministry of the Interior has expanded its authority to interpret the 1988 regulations pertaining to the revocations of nationality.<sup>21</sup> While the regulations were initially used to remove nationality from green card holders, the Follow-Up and Inspection Department has recently begun to revoke nationality based on other (often seemingly arbitrary) criteria.<sup>22</sup> Palestinians who were initially issued yellow cards are now having them replaced with green cards without warning. The exchange of a yellow card for a green card involves the removal of one's national identification number from the document. The removal is significant, as nationality numbers became the determiner of Jordanian nationality in 1992; the Jordanian government no longer recognizes Jordanians without this number as nationals, rendering many of them stateless again – as they were before 1950.<sup>23</sup> The extent of nationality revocations is unclear, as official numbers have never been released. However, estimates regarding the number of revocations that have thus far occurred range from the hundreds to the tens of thousands.<sup>24</sup>

### Nationality under Jordanian Law

The recent nationality revocations are not a result of legal, administrative, or constitutional changes. Rather, nationality is being stripped based on a tenuous interpretation of the 1988 Disengagement Regulations. The terms of these revocations have not been clearly defined, and lack a solid legal foundation. Article 5 of the Jordanian constitution states that nationality in the Kingdom “shall be defined by law.”<sup>25</sup> As a result, Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality remains the determiner of nationality rights in the Kingdom. Article 3 (i) of the 1954 law states that “[a]ny person who, not being Jewish, possessed Palestinian nationality before 15 May 1948 and was a regular resident in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan between 20 December 1949 and 16 February 1954.” Hence, the law very clearly recognizes Palestinian-Jordanians residing in the West Bank at this time (and their descendants through the male line) as full citizens within the Kingdom.

Article 18 of the 1954 law also identifies *all* the circumstances in which a Jordanian's nationality can be revoked, none of which relates to ethnicity. The sole reasons for nationality revocations are as follows:

- 1) Any person who enters the military service of a foreign State without the prior permission or leave of the Jordanian Council of Ministers and refuses to leave the same when so directed by the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan shall lose his nationality.
- 2) The Council of Ministers may, with the approval of His Majesty, declare that a Jordanian has lost Jordanian nationality if:
  - a) He enters the civil service of a foreign State and refuses to leave the same when so directed by the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan;
  - b) He enters the service of an enemy State;
  - c) He commits or attempts to commit an act deemed to endanger the peace and security of the State.<sup>26</sup>

Because nationality is not being revoked based on specific legal conditions, legal redress is rendered difficult. Some Palestinian-Jordanians with good connections have been able to reverse revocations, but judicial review is nearly impossible. In 1990, the High Court of Justice ruled that disengagement was an act of sovereignty and was thus outside of the court's jurisdiction; it maintained that "[i]t is a well recognized principle that issues of nationality fall within the very domestic jurisdiction of the state."<sup>27</sup> It is difficult to determine on what basis the court is grounding this "well recognized principle," given the constitution's clear enunciation that nationality is to be regulated by law. In 1998, Farouq Kilani, then the president of the Jordanian High Court of Justice – which is entitled to review the legality of administrative decisions – challenged the government's suggestion that the revocation of nationality can constitute an "act of state." Kilani correctly argued that nationality is a matter regulated by the law in Jordan and thus the revocations undertaken by the Inspection and Follow-Up Department were unconstitutional and void.<sup>28</sup> As a result of this ruling, Kilani's resignation was demanded by the Minister of Justice.<sup>29</sup>

### **Nationality Under International Law**

While a review of all relevant international law is naturally beyond the scope of this paper, there are several particularly pertinent points that should be noted:

- The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "[e]verybody has the right to a nationality."<sup>30</sup>
- Article 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) state, "[e]very child shall have the right to acquire a nationality."<sup>31</sup>
- While nationality is determined by the state, a state's laws are supposed to reflect international laws. According to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), nationality is "a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments."<sup>32</sup> Working from this principle, the ICJ maintained that states ought to avoid rendering anyone stateless who has a genuine link to that country.<sup>33</sup>
- The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness states that a country (1) must not "deprive a person of his nationality if such deprivation would render him stateless;" (2) must not "deprive any person or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds;" and that it (3) "shall grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless."<sup>34</sup>
- Articles 12 and 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and articles 24 and 28 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), both of which Jordan is party to, expound the rights to education and health respectively. Moreover, the ICESCR and the CRC forbid the exercise of these rights to be based on any form of discrimination related to national origin.<sup>35</sup>

The government has tried to counter indictments against its revocations by claiming that it is not rendering Palestinian-Jordanians stateless, as they are already citizens of Palestine. It furthermore argues that it is merely following the Arab League interdiction that prohibits dual Arab nationality. However, apart from the fact that the Arab League resolution is not binding and that Palestinians do not have a state, the Arab League also formally recognizes the Palestinians as a special exception to its ban on dual Arab nationalities.<sup>36</sup> While the UN General Assembly's recognition of Palestine in 2012 has

the potential to affect the status of Palestine and Palestinians, Palestine's legal status has not yet changed, and it remains to be seen what effect the decision will have upon Palestinian statelessness.<sup>37</sup>

### **Implications of Loss of Nationality**

A loss of nationality carries very severe consequences, as the Hashemite Kingdom has no refugee law and non-citizens, therefore, have no guaranteed political, civil, or economic rights.<sup>38</sup> Hence, a loss of nationality renders a person ineligible for state services and deprived of a number of fundamental rights:

1. Health care: Jordanian citizens are entitled to a substantial number of free or low cost medical services at government facilities. Non-national users, however, are forced to pay exorbitantly higher service fees.<sup>39</sup>
2. Education: Palestinian-Jordanians who are downgraded to two and five year temporary passports are treated as foreigners and are forced to pay vastly higher fees. This inequality renders it increasingly difficult for non-citizens to enroll in Jordanian universities.<sup>40</sup>
3. Property ownership: Holders of temporary passports do not have the right to own property. They are required to have a Jordanian partner for any property they own and to request the approval of a ministerial council.<sup>41</sup>
4. Movement: Because many Palestinian-Jordanians fear having their current passports exchanged for temporary ones that lack national numbers, some Palestinian-Jordanians are choosing to not renew their passports.
5. Family rights: A Human Rights Watch report on nationality revocations in Jordan has revealed that in situations where a father loses his Jordanian nationality, the nationalities of his children are usually also revoked. This loss of nationality happens regardless of whether or not the mother is a Jordanian citizen, as Jordanian law does not transfer nationality maternally.<sup>42</sup> This is in violation of Article 7 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, which forbids knowingly rendering a child stateless.<sup>43</sup>

### **Nationality Revocations: Heightening Fear of Political Participation**

While the exact number of people who have lost their rights as a result of nationality revocations remains unclear, the immense amount of Jordanian-Palestinians who have been indirectly affected by the process is evident. The arbitrary and unexpected nature with which the Follow-Up Department has approached its task has left the entire population of Jordanian-Palestinians unsure of their position within Jordanian society.<sup>44</sup> Many within the Kingdom feel as if they are excluded by the government's depiction of "Jordanian identity," or as if they are "mere passers-by or second-class citizens in their country."<sup>45</sup> They live in constant fear that if they step out of line the government could simply reduce them to "guests" within the Kingdom.<sup>46</sup> This anxiety has made Jordanians extremely cautious and encouraged many to eschew bureaucratic engagement.<sup>47</sup>

While Jordanian nationality rights – which are legally and constitutionally protected – were considered relatively safe before 1988, Jordan's unilateral disengagement and subsequent sporadic revocations, have made it clear that the government can (and will) extra-legally deny Jordanians rights in the Kingdom, leaving them with no recourse or options. As a result, the Jordanian Initiative for Equal Citizenship, which is composed of a group of prominent Palestinian-Jordanians, maintains that "[m]any people now believe that the principle of equality, for which the Constitution calls, is a worn-out concept and

a remnant of the past.”<sup>48</sup> Phone surveys that the Identity Center undertook regarding identity revealed that the ease with which nationality has recently been revoked has decreased the value that Jordanians place upon their nationality.<sup>49</sup> As a result of revocations, nationality has declined in importance, for Jordanian nationality holders no longer feel as if they are able to depend upon guaranteed future rights.

This fear of nationality loss permeates through every facet of Palestinian-Jordanian life in the Kingdom, but its effects are most unequivocally manifest in terms of political participation, or lack thereof. Despite the fact that Palestinian-Jordanians represent a large demographic component within the Kingdom that is very active in the private sector, they have been unable to achieve significant political representation.<sup>50</sup> The inability to translate demographic and economic capital into political capital is a direct result of the Palestinian-Jordanian sense of precarious identity and nationality. While a lack of affinity with being “Jordanian” has constituted a long-standing impediment to political participation, this inactivity has also been reinforced by a weakened sense of stability since 1988.

### **Effects on Protests of 2011**

The Palestinian-Jordanian fear of political participation has not dissipated in the last quarter century; the unwillingness to become politically active was particularly evident during the 2011 uprising that swept across Jordan as the “Arab Awakening” gained momentum in the region. Calls for political reform within the Kingdom emerged predominately from the East Bank-Jordanian population. Palestinian-Jordanians, on the other hand, were less critical of the regime and focused instead on campaigns to secure equal rights within the Kingdom.<sup>51</sup> This unwillingness to oppose the government largely stemmed from two factors that contributed to a Palestinian-Jordanian sense of insecurity in the Kingdom; apart from (1) fears of being reduced to “guests” and having their nationalities revoked, Palestinian-Jordanians were apprehensive about (2) the possibility of a regime change.<sup>52</sup> Given their already uncertain position within Jordanian society, they worried that a regime change in the Kingdom could lead to a deteriorated situation. Palestinian-Jordanians, to a large extent, view the Hashemite monarchy as a safety net for their rights in the Kingdom. While the government has pursued policies detrimental to Palestinian-Jordanians rights, the Hashemite monarchy has consistently reaffirmed the equal rights of Palestinians in Jordan. Because of this close relationship, Palestinian-Jordanians have been hesitant to contest the position of the Hashemites.

### **East Bank-Jordanian Precariousness**

Palestinian-Jordanians are reliant upon the monarchy, as they feel as if the Hashemites perform a mediating role in Jordanian society. Indeed, Palestinian-Jordanians are nervous about any arrangement in which East Bank-Jordanians could exert unchecked influence. East Bank-Jordanians would likely change the status quo drastically, as they too feel as if their current position within Jordan is uncertain. This uncertainly partially stems from the presence and position of Palestinian-Jordanians within the Kingdom. Many East Bank-Jordanians feel as if Palestinian-Jordanians reap the benefits of being Jordanian, but do not fully commit to the Kingdom. This is particularly salient in economic terms, as East Bank-Jordanians are angered by what they perceive to be a

Palestinian-Jordanian dominance of the private sector. East Bankers believe themselves to be unfairly carrying the national burden, whilst “others” derive equal benefits simply by residing within Jordan.

The belief that Palestinian-Jordanians are unfairly benefitting at East Bank-Jordanian expense has been reinforced by a tandem fear: that the growing number and prominence of Palestinian-Jordanians in the kingdom encourages Israel’s argument that Jordan constitutes an “alternative homeland” for Palestinians. The “alternative homeland” scheme, which suggests that Jordan should be transformed into a Palestinian state so that Israel can take control of all of historic Palestine, first gained prominence in the 1970s with the rise of the Likud party in Israel. In recent years this argument has once again found advocates both in Israel as well as Europe (amongst figures such as the Dutch Geert Wilders).<sup>53</sup>

The long-standing threat of this plan, and especially its more recent advocacy, has naturally worried East Bank-Jordanians. They are reluctant to approve any legislation that buttresses the position of Palestinian-Jordanians in the Kingdom. As such, many East Bankers fear that providing Palestinian-Jordanians with increased political and civil rights will only further encourage the plan and facilitate its enactment. Owing to the potency of these arguments, some East Bank nationalists have exploited the threat of the “alternative homeland” scheme as an excuse to maintain the *status quo* and, thus, the continued disenfranchisement of Palestinian-Jordanians. However, despite these excuses, the plan does present East Banker Jordanians with legitimate concerns vis-à-vis the Palestinian-Jordanian position in the country. Indeed, as a result of both the perceived Palestinian-Jordanian dominance of the private sector and the threat that Jordan could be transformed into a Palestinian state, East Bank-Jordanians fear they are losing their homeland to “outsiders”.

These concerns have been further intensified by recent nationality grants. Notwithstanding the fact that Jordan’s Investment Promotion Act allows foreigners to gain nationality (as an incentive for investments in the Kingdom), there are also suggestions that politically important non-nationals have similarly been granted nationality within the Kingdom based on unspecified justifications.<sup>54</sup> These financially and politically motivated grants have further diminished Jordanians’ trust in the government and damaged its legitimacy. Just as the Identity Center survey revealed that nationality revocations negatively impacted the value that Jordanians attach to nationality, so too did it highlight the equally harmful effect of nationality grants.<sup>55</sup> The survey also indicated that an overwhelming amount of Jordanians support stricter conditions for acquiring nationality.<sup>56</sup> Without stricter conditions, arbitrary grants will continue to occur, further depreciating the importance Jordanians vest in nationality and forcing them to rely on other means of buttressing their rights and defining their own identities.

## PREVIOUS NATION BUILDING EXERCISES:

### “Jordanization”

Since the 1950 inclusion of Palestinians in the Hashemite Kingdom, the government has continually experimented with new methods for fostering a unified national identity. All of these programs, however, have focused on enforcing a prescribed national identity upon a mixed population, rather than securing a concept of legal nationality on top of which identities could evolve naturally and innocuously. Initially the government attempted to integrate Palestinians into the Kingdom by means of a “Jordanization” campaign that concentrated on fostering a hybrid national identity. This hybridity was not tied to an East Bank or Palestinian identity, but to a unified “Jordanian identity” based on the Islamic and Arab nationalist credentials of the Hashemite monarchy.<sup>57</sup> Yet, to realize this unification, the government imposed a new prescriptive identity upon the Kingdom’s different social groups. Thus, while the campaign focused on a hybrid identity, and *not* assimilation, what it imposed neither described the self-identification of most Jordanians, nor reflected an identity dialogue to which they had contributed.

A reconstituted “Jordanization” policy emerged following the 1970 September conflict. During Identity Center focus groups, which we convened with Jordanians involved in politics, civil society, and academic research to discuss issues of identity, participants stressed that 1970 represented a watershed moment in Jordan, dividing the Kingdom between Palestinian-Jordanians and East Bank-Jordanians. While the conflict pushed many Palestinian-Jordanians towards the PLO, it simultaneously provoked East Bank anger against what they believed to be a Palestinian betrayal and consequently pushed them towards the monarchy.<sup>58</sup> If the Hashemite goal of creating a unified and hybrid Jordanian identity had ever produced tangible results, they now started to unravel, and two distinct communal identities began to emerge.

Appreciating this growing demographic divide as well as the shortcomings of its former hybrid identity, the government began to focus on a culturally framed Jordanian identity, through which it emphasized that all citizens were members of a single Jordanian family.<sup>59</sup> Not only did the government hope that this would address the growing post-conflict divides in the Kingdom, but it also sought to provide a rebuttal to Israel’s “alternative homeland” scheme. Indeed, it was at this junction that the idea first began to gain traction in Israeli policy circles. Given Jordan’s continued administrative and legal connection with the West Bank at the time, Israeli officials argued that Jordan was already a predominately Palestinian country, and that its having maintained links with the West Bank after the 1967 War would allow an expedient transfer of West Bankers into the East Bank. King Hussein’s new culturally defined identity allowed him to respond to these arguments. By asserting a distinct cultural difference between Jordanians and Palestinians through the Kingdom’s new identity campaign, he was able to firmly refute Israel’s “Jordan is Palestine” argument.<sup>60</sup>

To forge a new culturally defined Jordanian national identity, however, required Jordanians to collectively adopt a unified identity that did not reflect Jordan’s social

diversity. As such, even though the new identity was intended to encourage unity, it provoked resentment amongst various sections of the population that felt as if they were not represented by it. At the same time, the growing divide between Palestinian-Jordanians and East Bank-Jordanians was also fortified by the government's need to ensure loyalty in the public sector. During the conflict, the government had to crack down on members and supporters of the resistance. After the war, this initiative continued: members of the military, government, and bureaucracy who maintained any affiliation with the resistance were dismissed.<sup>61</sup> While Palestinian-Jordanians were not the process's exclusive target, they accounted for the majority of dismissals. The process soon gained its own momentum, and by the mid-1970s it had bloomed into an "East Bank first" agenda that privileged East Bank-Jordanians over their Palestinian-Jordanian counterparts in a number of different socio-political realms, including the public sector and higher education.<sup>62</sup>

### **Policy Shortcomings**

The divergent manifestations of "Jordanization" have yielded correspondingly different results. Yet, none has been able to foster national cohesion because each has focused on identity rather than nationality. That is, rather than first solidifying the legal fundamentals of being a Jordanian national, these government programs have emphasized perceived precepts of "Jordanian" culture and society as the basis of Jordan's national identity. This has opened the door to identity conflicts, separating those who are willing (and able) to adopt the prescriptive identity from those who are not. Consequently, the latter have experienced a greater sense of precariousness, as they do not feel equally "Jordanian."

A large majority of Jordanians that participated in the Identity Center's phone survey maintained that nation building programs have exerted a negative effect on society.<sup>63</sup> Indeed, by focusing on identity rather than nationality, these campaigns have reinforced identity conflicts within the Kingdom. They have made identity and nationality synonymous, and, consequently, transformed the already intense identity conflicts within the Kingdom into a discussion of nationality. As such, being a Jordanian citizen has become tantamount to identifying with a specific sub-group in the Kingdom, rather than with the holding of citizenship rights. The focus on ethnic and cultural identity has served to diminish the importance of legal nationality within the Kingdom. With subsequent citizenship revocations and grants, being legally defined as a "Jordanian" seems to be a distinction of declining importance.

### **AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH:**

#### **A Civil Basis for Nationality**

Identity Center focus group participants stressed that while some states benefit from the simplicity of having a more ethnically and culturally homogenous population, and thus a corresponding ethnicity and nationality, this is not the case in Jordan. There is no inherent ethnic or cultural concept that describes being a Jordanian national without excluding vast cross-sections of the Kingdom's population. To construct a national identity out of this heterogeneous population, therefore, requires a very strong legal foundation. The Hashemite family sought to provide such a basis with the 1952

Constitution and the 1954 Nationality Law, which together defined nationality on a civil basis. Since this time, however, forces within the establishment have subverted these fundamentals of Jordanian nationality, thereby allowing ethnic and cultural discrimination to corrupt the system (a process that has been highlighted by arbitrary nationality revocations and purchased nationality). As a result, the evolution of a unified national identity has been impaired, and Jordanians continue to define themselves based on exterior factors. While some Jordanians define themselves as “Eastern-Jordanians” or simply “Jordanian-Jordanians,” others in the Kingdom contrastingly refer to themselves as “Palestinian-Jordanians” or “Syrian-Jordanians.” In the absence of a solid legal basis for nationality, these sub-identities remain crucially important to Jordanian self-identification and detract from national unity.

### **Deconstructing Hyphenated-Nationality**

Focus group participants emphasized that identity is not purely related to one’s association with the state; a person’s identity is also made up of alternate influences that are personal, communal, and societal, such as religion, ethnicity, culture, social class, tribe, gender, etc. Nationality contributes to one’s identity, but nationality does not solely constitute one’s identity. Identity and nationality, therefore, are related, but not synonymous. Nationality is determined by one’s legal rights and obligations within a state, not by one’s sub-identities. Thus, while a Jordanian may not have an ethnicity, culture, or religion that corresponds with the characteristics of an indigenous East Banker, if he or she maintains Jordanian nationality, he or she should be entitled to all the same rights as any other Jordanian national. Maintaining a hyphenated-identity, therefore, does not inherently constitute a barrier to national unity or stability. A person can be a Jordanian national and also maintain sub-identities without detracting from his or her nationality or national identity. However, when nationality and identity are conflated, as the government has done, these hyphenated-identities transform into hyphenated-nationalities and divide the country along the fracture lines of sub-identities.

King Abdullah II has continually stressed the importance of a liberal and representative democracy in which no person is above the law, regardless of his or her ethnic background.<sup>64</sup> This emphasis on the rule of law encapsulates the path that must be pursued in the Kingdom. Above all else, every Jordanian, irrespective of personal association, must have his or her rights as a Jordanian guaranteed. Rights cannot be subject to arbitrary revocations or purchased bestowals, for without legal assurance, genuine participation in Jordan’s democracy cannot exist. Before issues of identity within the Kingdom can be discussed, equal rights must stand as the foundation of Jordanian nationality. Atop a clear and unambiguous definition of nationality, sub-identities – which are currently confused with national identity – will be able to flourish, for if nationality is firmly established on civil grounds, differences within society are able not simply to exist, but to thrive and benefit the Kingdom. If a person’s rights as a national are guaranteed, sub-identities need not lead to the insertion of a hyphen in one’s national identity. Only when a person feels insecure or alienated within a state is he or she forced to first cling to these smaller, more personal identities.

### **Mutual Benefits of Solidified Nationality**

Participants that contributed to focus groups convened for this paper emphasized that Jordanian identity is still evolving and in a state of flux. Indeed, identity is not static: it will never reach a point of full maturation, for it dynamically adapts and evolves in relation to socio-political changes and popular discourse.<sup>65</sup> Many Jordanians, including individuals involved in our focus groups, have argued that the consolidation of a Jordanian national identity must await the creation of a Palestinian state. Only then, they argue, can nationality and identity be clarified. This, however, is not a viable solution. The realization of a Palestinian state remains elusive, and the status of Palestinian-Jordanians –and by extension all Jordanians – cannot remain tentative until Palestine is secured. If citizenship can be either revoked or granted extra-legally, Jordanian nationality, and therefore identity, will remain precarious. Hence, providing a secure civil framework for Jordanian nationality that also functions in the interim must be considered a policy priority. Only after a legal basis for nationality is solidified, will sub-identity decline in importance, and cease to divide the nation.

While the government has been reluctant to pursue these policy objectives, they too have a stake in solidifying nationality; Jordan's stability is dependent upon solid inter-communal relations within the Kingdom. In the past, forces within the Jordanian government have intentionally exacerbated ethnic divides within the Kingdom in order to weather socio-political crises (such as 1970 or 2011). When they have deemed it useful to use ethnic divisions to scapegoat or suppress opposition, these government forces have carefully “manipulated” ethnic divides, pitting ethnic groups against one another.<sup>66</sup> A divided population, however, is not a viable long-term policy. Neither divide and rule, nor a reliance on al-‘ashira is a durable strategy for Jordanian governance. Only by fostering social cohesion can the government maintain enduring stability and legitimacy.

### **POLICY SUGGESTIONS:**

To realize a clear and unambiguous basis of Jordanian nationality and address the current lack of political participation in the Kingdom, the Identity Center proposes several specific policy suggestions. These suggestions focus on laying a firm foundation for nationality upon which further identities can develop.

#### **Suggestions for addressing disengagement and nationality revocations**

- To solidify Palestinian-Jordanian citizenship in the country, the implications of the disengagement regulations need to be clarified. The government must emphasize that the revocation of citizenship can only occur as a result of the legally specified conditions. While a majority of Jordanians surveyed for this paper supported constitutionally or legally defining the disengagement regulations, others feared the potential implications of pursuing that entrenchment before the creation of a Palestinian state. Working within the confines of these opposing concerns, the government can start by clearly placing matters pertaining to citizenship under judicial jurisdiction rather than the Follow-Up and Inspection Department. Only by explicitly moving citizenship away from the disengagement process can the

government make Jordanians confident that their rights as citizens are legally protected.<sup>67</sup>

- Those Palestinian-Jordanians who have wrongfully lost their citizenship should have their citizenship and rights returned to them. To accomplish this, the Constitutional Court needs to review all cases in which nationality has been revoked since disengagement.
- Judicial jurisdiction over issues pertaining to citizenship should be reaffirmed so that neither “acts of state” nor “sovereignty issues” can override judicial decisions or constitutional rights. This will require further progress in the current efforts to expand judicial autonomy. A reaffirmation of judicial authority is in accordance with public opinion, as a majority of Jordanians who participated in our survey indicated that they did not believe that the government should be in charge of revoking or granting citizenship.<sup>68</sup>
- Jordanians who possess yellow cards should be recognized as full citizens of the Kingdom. Regardless of their status as Palestinians, they are nationals and residents of Jordan and are legally entitled to citizenship. Continuing to define their status in Jordan based on their status in Palestine only leads to the continued self-identification as a hyphenated-Jordanian.

#### **Suggestions regarding equal nationality rights**

- The Kingdom should end the practice of illegal nationality grants and review the cases of those who wrongfully hold nationality within Jordan. The government should amend laws promoting investments so that wealthy non-nationals are neither granted citizenship, nor expanded rights within the Kingdom.
- The Citizenship law should be amended to ensure that collective or political naturalization is prevented. This could be achieved by attaching a variety of condition such as marriage or actual investment or genuine investment to citizenship bestowals. With this, a legally designated period of residency could also be made a mandatory co-requisite.
- Women should be bestowed with equal nationality rights to men. They require the ability to transfer their nationality to their offspring regardless of their husband’s nationality. Sixty three percent of Jordanians who participated in our survey for this paper said they believed that Jordanian women should be able to pass full political and civil rights to their children and another twenty five percent indicated that they supported furnishing their offspring with civil rights only.<sup>69</sup>
- New laws should be established that prohibit discrimination based on ethnicity, or any other distinction. This includes affirmative action programs and discriminatory policies that benefit or disadvantage a single ethnicity.
- A refugee law should be passed within Jordan to clearly define the rights and obligations of those residing in the country without citizenship. This law will have to address issues such as equal access to education: according to Jordan’s international commitments, all children residing within the Kingdom should be provided with the same access to education as its nationals.

#### **Suggestions regarding political equality within the Kingdom**

- The Elections Law should be amended so that the constituencies do not unequally favor specific demographics within the country. The current seat allocations fall short of satisfying international standards for fair elections and equal suffrage.

- The practice of forming governments based on ethnic or regional quotas must be eliminated. The current practice does not reflect King Abdullah II's emphasis on political integrity and equality; the formation of the government needs to have these values at its base.
- Amendments to the current Elections Law, particularly those pertaining to constituency divisions, should be undertaken to ensure that tribally and communally based parties are not fortified. Instead the government should create an atmosphere in which political parties can emerge and promote the interests of Jordanians.
- The recommendations proposed by King Abdullah II's National Dialogue Committee on June 5, 2011 should be earnestly considered. The Committee's report includes a comprehensive list of beneficial constitutional amendments and legal reforms which target the crucial role of political parties. Their suggestions will facilitate national stability, political participation, and the emergence of representative political parties.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> King Abdullah II, "Speech by His Majesty King Abdullah II at the Graduation Ceremony of the 26th Class of Muta Military Wing," The Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Washington, D.C., June 16, 2013. <<<http://jordanembassyus.org/news/speech-his-majesty-king-abdullah-ii-graduation-ceremony-26th-class-muta-universitys-military>>>

<sup>2</sup> This most comprehensive and most frequently cited of these reports was produced by Human Rights Watch. See Human Rights Watch, *Stateless Again: Palestinian-Origin Jordanians Deprived of their Nationality*, February 2, 2010.

<sup>3</sup> The Identity Center undertook a 500 person, semi-representative poll with a +/- 3% margin of error. 20% of those surveyed were between 18 and 22 years of age, 42.5% were between 23 and 30, 30% were between 31 and 40, 5% between 41 and 50, and 2.5% were above 50. 32.5% of those surveyed were female and 67.5% were male. 17% lived in the North of Jordan, 58% in the center, 20% in the South, and 5% lived outside of Jordan. Each participant was asked 10 questions, 6 of which were yes or no questions, whilst the remaining 4 were multiple choice.

<sup>4</sup> For a more detailed overview of refugee statistics, see Human Rights Watch, *Stateless Again*.

<sup>5</sup> Laurie A. Brand, "Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Summer 1995): 47.

<sup>6</sup> Oroub al Abed, "Palestinians Refugees in Jordan," *Forced Migration Online* (February 2004): 4. <<<http://www.forcedmigration.org/research-resources/expert-guides/palestinian-refugees-in-jordan>>>

<sup>7</sup> Hazem Jamjoum, "Palestinian Refugees in Jordan and the Revocation of Citizenship: An Interview with Anis F. Kassim," *Jadaliyya*, January 28, 2013.

<<<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/9827/palestinian-refugees-in-jordan-and-the-revocation>>>

<sup>8</sup> Al Abed, "Palestinians Refugees in Jordan," 5.

<sup>9</sup> League of Arab States, "Seventh Arab League Summit Conference Resolution on Palestine," Rabat, October 28, 1974.

<<<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/63d9a930e2b428df852572c0006d06b8?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,rabat>>>

<sup>10</sup> Philip Robins, "Shedding Half a Kingdom: Jordan's Dismantling of Ties with the West Bank," *Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies)*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1989): 168-170.

<sup>11</sup> Asher Susser, "In Through the Out Door: Jordan's Disengagement and the Middle East," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Policy Papers*, No. 19 (1990) 37.

<sup>12</sup> Kingdom of Jordan, *Disengagement Regulation for the Year 1988*, 28 July 1988.

<<<http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=43cd04b94>>>

<sup>13</sup> See Human Rights Watch, *Stateless Again*, 1.

<sup>14</sup> Laurie A. Brand, "The Intifadah and the Arab World: Old Players, New Roles," *International Journal*, Vol. 45, No. 3 Israel and the Arabs Since the Intifadah (Summer 1990): 508.

- <sup>15</sup> Jamjoum, "Palestinian Refugees in Jordan," 2.
- <sup>16</sup> Al Abed, "Palestinians Refugees in Jordan," 12.
- <sup>17</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Stateless Again*, 2.
- <sup>18</sup> Kingdom of Jordan, "Statement Concerning Disengagement from the West Bank and Palestinian Self-Determination," *International Legal Materials*, Vol. 27, No. 6 (November 1988) 1642.
- <sup>19</sup> Al Abed, "Palestinians Refugees in Jordan," 12.
- <sup>20</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Stateless Again*, 22.
- <sup>21</sup> Jamjoum, "Palestinian Refugees in Jordan," 3.
- <sup>22</sup> See Human Rights Watch, *Stateless Again*.
- <sup>23</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Stateless Again*, 5.
- <sup>24</sup> The most often cited figure was produced in a Human Rights Watch report. It claims that over 2,700 Jordanians of Palestinian origin lost their nationality between 2004 and 2008. See Human Rights Watch, *Stateless Again*, 5. In 2009, a *Jordan Times* article refuted the claims that the process of nationality revocations was taking place. It maintained that the authorities were legitimately regulating the distribution of bridge cards as per the disengagement regulations. The article stated that authorities had "replaced 190 yellow cards with green ones and 5,130 green cards with yellow ones in the period between March 1 and June 30, 2009, and replaced 204 yellow cards with green and 4,139 green with yellow in the same period in 2008." See K. Malkawi, "House Panel Backs Ministry Procedures on 'Citizenship Revocation'," *Jordan Times*, July 17 2009. <<<http://jordantimes.com/house-panel-backs-ministry-procedures-on-citizenship-revocation>>>
- <sup>25</sup> Kingdom of Jordan, "The Constitution of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," January 1, 1952. <<[http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution\\_jo.html](http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html)>>
- <sup>26</sup> Kingdom of Jordan, "Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality" (last amended 1987), January 1, 1954. <<<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ea13.html>>>
- <sup>27</sup> Kingdom of Jordan, "High Court of Justice, Decision 164/90," *Palestine Yearbook of International Law 1990-1991*, 70.
- <sup>28</sup> Jamjoum, "Palestinian Refugees in Jordan," 4-5.
- <sup>29</sup> Jamjoum, "Palestinian Refugees in Jordan," 5.
- <sup>30</sup> "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (UDHR), adopted December 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948), art. 15.
- <sup>31</sup> "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (ICCPR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976, art. 24. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force September 2, 1990, art. 7.
- <sup>32</sup> International Court of Justice, Notteböhme Case, Liechtenstein vs. Guatemala, I.C.J. Rep. 4, 1955.
- <sup>33</sup> International Court of Justice, Notteböhme Case, Liechtenstein vs. Guatemala, I.C.J. Rep. 4, 1955.
- <sup>34</sup> "Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness," 989 U.N.T.S. 175, entered into force December 13, 1975, art. 8.
- <sup>35</sup> "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (ICESCR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3. Entered into force January 3, 1976, art. 2; and "Convention on the Rights of the Child" (CRC), G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989). Entered into force September 2, 1990,
- <sup>36</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Stateless Again*, 19.
- <sup>37</sup> The Independent Commission for Human Rights has put together an impressive collection of legal documents pertaining to this issue. See, The Independent Commission for Human Rights, "Palestine as a Non-Member Observer State of the United Nations: A Series of Legal Reports, 79" ed. by Yaser Ghazi Alawneh, 2013; and Lauren Banko, "Citizenship and the New 'State of Palestine'," *Jadaliyya*, December 2, 2012. <<<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8736/citizenship-and-the-new-state-of-palestine>>>
- <sup>38</sup> Jamjoum, "Palestinian Refugees in Jordan," 5.
- <sup>39</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Stateless Again*, 49.
- <sup>40</sup> The Convention Against Discrimination in Education, to which Jordan became party in 1976, requires countries "[t]o give foreign nationals resident within their territory the same access to education as that given to their own nationals." See "Convention Against Discrimination in Education," adopted December

14, 1960, UNESCO General Conference, 11th Session, Paris. Entered into force May 22, 1962.

<sup>41</sup> Al Abed, "Palestinians Refugees in Jordan," 18.

<sup>42</sup> See Kingdom of Jordan, "Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality;" and Human Rights Watch, *Stateless Again*."

<sup>43</sup> "Convention on the Rights of the Child," Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 20 November 1989. <<<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx>>>

<sup>44</sup> Jamjoum, "Palestinian Refugees in Jordan," 4.

<sup>45</sup> The Jordanian Initiative for Equal Citizenship, "Jordanian Initiative for Equal Citizenship Letter to King Abdullah II," August 2, 2012. <<[http://www.al-shabaka.org/sites/default/files/AbedRantawi\\_Commentary\\_En\\_Oct\\_2012\\_letter.pdf](http://www.al-shabaka.org/sites/default/files/AbedRantawi_Commentary_En_Oct_2012_letter.pdf)>>

<sup>46</sup> Lamis el Muhtaseb, "Jordan's East Banker Palestinian Schism," *Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF)*, April 2013, 2.

<<[http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow\\_site/storage/original/application/746892aacedd3e8fcb1ff7370a77fb67.pdf](http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/746892aacedd3e8fcb1ff7370a77fb67.pdf)>>

<sup>47</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Stateless Again*," 28.

<sup>48</sup> The Jordanian Initiative for Equal Citizenship, "Citizenship Letter to King Abdullah II."

<sup>49</sup> When survey participants were asked, "Do you think that that the ease with which withdrawal of nationality has been undertaken affects the value of nationality?" 85% answered in the affirmative, while 12.5% said that it had not.

<sup>50</sup> Yitzhak Reiter, "The Palestinian-Jordanian Rift: Economic Might and Political Power in Jordan," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Winter 2004): 84.

<sup>51</sup> In focus groups that the Identity Center convened with East Bank-Jordanians, participants noted that many of the Palestinian-Jordanian members of HIRAK, while struggling hand in hand with their East Bank brethren, agreed that they should try to present the HIRAK as being East Bank movements. The Palestinian-Jordanians, the focus group participants unanimously agreed, largely confined themselves to more moderate demands. Also see El Muhtaseb, "Jordan's East Banker Palestinian Schism," 2.

<sup>52</sup> El Muhtaseb, "Jordan's East Banker Palestinian Schism," 2.

<sup>53</sup> Lamis Andoni, "Jordan Is Not Palestine," *Aljazeera*, July 4, 2010.

<<<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/07/2010748131864654.html>>>

<sup>54</sup> See The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, "Law No. (16) of 1995 and Its Amendments for the Year 2000, The Investment Promotion Law," first published in the *Official Gazette* No. 4075 October 16, 1996, and subsequently amended in Law No. (13) of 2000 published in the *Official Gazette* No. 4423, April 2, 2000; and "Al-Sharida request the withdrawal of Jordanian Nationality from Iraqi Investors," *Gerasa News*.

<<<http://www.gerasanews.com/print.php?id=79271>>> ; and "In Names... This Is How the Jordanian Nationality Is Sold to Investors," *Jordan News*, May 30, 2013.

<<<http://www.jordannews.com/jordan/19289.html>>>

<sup>55</sup> When survey participants were asked, "Do you think that that the ease with which nationality has been given affects the value of nationality?" 74.36% answered in the affirmative, while 23.08% said that it had not.

<sup>56</sup> In response to the question, "Are you in support of amending the Nationality Law to make it stricter?" 67.5% indicated that they were in support and 32.5% percent said that they were not: the remainder of those polled were unsure.

<sup>57</sup> Rex Brynen, "Palestine and the Arab State System: Permeability, State Consolidation and the Intifada," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Sept. 1991): 616; and Brand, "Palestinians and Jordanians," 50.

<sup>58</sup> Lamis Andoni, "Jordan," in *Echoes of the Intifada, Regional Repercussions of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict* ed. Rex Brynen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 172-180; and Hussein Sirriyeh, "Jordan and the Legacies of the Civil War of 1970-71," *Civil Wars*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Sept. 2007): 79. Sirriyeh, "Jordan and the Legacies of the Civil War of 1970-71," 77.

<sup>59</sup> Joseph A. Massad, *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 71.

<sup>60</sup> Massad, *Colonial Effects*, ch 2.

<sup>61</sup> Philip Robins, *A History of Jordan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 131-132; and Adnan Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 190.

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<sup>62</sup> Sirriyeh, “Jordan and the Legacies of the Civil War of 1970-71,” 77.

<sup>63</sup> In response to the question “Are you in support of amending the Nationality Law in a way that makes it stricter?” 67.5% said “yes” and 32.5% said “no.”

<sup>64</sup> For example, see King Abdullah II, “Speech by His Majesty King Abdullah II at the Graduation Ceremony of the 26th Class of Muta University’s Military Wing,” The Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Washington, D.C., June 16, 2013. <<<http://jordanembassyus.org/news/speech-his-majesty-king-abdullah-ii-graduation-ceremony-26th-class-muta-universitys-military>>>; and “We Appreciate the Tribes and We Cannot Protect Ourselves,” *Al-Rai*, June 16, 2013. <<<http://www.alrai.com/article/591261.html>>>

<sup>65</sup> Jillian Schwedler, “Islamic Identity: Myth, Menace, or Mobilizer?” *SAIS Review*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Summer-Fall 2001): 3-4.

<sup>66</sup> Sirriyeh, “Jordan and the Legacies of the Civil War,” 77.

<sup>67</sup> When survey participants were asked, “How should the disengagement regulations be dealt with?” 15.38% said that they supported maintaining the current situation, whilst 27.21% said that they supported its being translated into law, 27.21% said that they believed it should be entrenched in the constitution, and another 27.21% said they were unsure.

<sup>68</sup> When survey participants were asked, “Do you agree that the government should be the body in charge of granting or withdrawing citizenship?” 58.97%, 25.9%, and the remainder indicated that they were unsure.

<sup>69</sup> When survey participants were asked, “What do you think is the best means of dealing with the children of Jordanian mothers?” 64.1% indicated that they should be given political and civil rights, 25.64% said that they should receive once civil rights, and 10.26% believed that they should only receive residency.

<sup>70</sup> National Dialogue Committee, “Principles of Political Reform in Jordan and Its Directions,” submitted June 5, 2011. <<<http://www.jordanpolitics.org/en/files/docs/outputs.pdf>>>